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The Treaty Annuity as Livelihood 




Of all federal benefits, the treaty annuity payment is perhaps the most difficult 
to understand and justify in a modern context. Every year, Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada (INAC) distributes four or five dollars to individual registered 
Indians who are either members of, or affiliated with, First Nations that signed 
historic treaties with the Crown. Under terms of thirteen treaties signed between 
1850 and 1921, covering over half of the land mass of Canada, these annual 
payments are made to over three hundred thousand registered Indians from 
approximately three hundred First Nations. Clearly the purchasing power of four 
or five dollars in today’s terms is insignificant, and far less than its value at the 
time the treaties were signed.1
For the federal government, this payment represents partial fulfilment of 
ongoing treaty obligations in exchange for surrendered Indian title to land—what 
amounts to a legal obligation of a contractual nature. First Nations, however, have 
often characterized the treaty annuity as renewal of a nation-to-nation agreement 
to share the land in exchange for assurances of livelihood assistance for themselves 
and future generations. This paper examines the extent of discussion and debate 
concerning the annuity payment as support for Aboriginal livelihood leading up 
to and during treaty negotiations, and afterwards as part of treaty implementation. 
In this regard, the annuities must be understood in the context of the overall treaty 
bundle of benefits designed to assist First Nations to either maintain existing 
means of livelihood or transition to new means of survival in a changing world. 
The rationale for the annuity, as well as its significance as an economic benefit, 
is examined in some detail, including its value in today’s dollars. The evidence is 
clear that both sides of the treaty relationship viewed the provision for livelihood 
assistance into the future as an important objective of the treaties.
The historical and modern meaning of the annuity as relationship renewal and 
as an annual reminder of obligations and promises is also examined. The consis-
tency and regularity of the annuity payment in many ways remains at the heart of 
the treaty relationship between First Nations and the federal government. It speaks 
to an ongoing obligation to honour what are often characterized from the First 
Nation perspective as sacred agreements. It further lends an air of immediacy to 
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these historical documents and represents a yearly renewal of the treaty relation-
ship, which accords well with the First Nation perspective of the treaties as sacred 
“living” agreements. Here, the parties to the treaties differed significantly in their 
views. While government assumed that the terms of treaty were fully bound up in 
unchanging perpetuity in the written text, First Nations assumed that treaty terms 
could be reviewed and renegotiated as part of relationship or treaty renewal.
Rationale for the Treaty Annuity
Any discussion of the rationale for the annuity must begin with a discussion of 
the broader rationale for land surrender treaties, as required by the Royal Procla-
mation of 1763. The Royal Proclamation was written in large part in reaction to 
settler expansion of the Thirteen Colonies, and formally recognized Aboriginal 
land rights by stating that Indian lands could only be taken up for settlement 
purposes through formal purchase by representatives of the British Crown. It 
came to be understood, in effect, as a policy directive governing future purchases 
of First Nation land. The Crown’s primary motivation to negotiate land surrender 
treaties was essentially an exercise in imperialism—whether to open up new lands 
for settlement or to access natural resources or otherwise secure a right-of-way. 
The Aboriginal motivation generally included a desire to formalize relations of 
peace and proactively negotiate assistance for future generations in recognition of 
inevitable and rapid change.
Beginning in the early 1800s, there was another motivating factor that impacted 
the Crown’s approach to dealing with First Nations that had partly to do with 
developing philanthropic and humanitarian ideologies. Where First Nations had 
once been considered critical military allies of both the French and British Crowns, 
after the War of 1812, the British Crown began to see First Nations increasingly as 
a burden. They not only represented a growing expense on the Imperial Treasury 
as their traditional means of livelihood came under threat from competing land 
and resource interests, but were also in possession of large tracts of land wanted 
for settlement or other colonialist activity. The solution was seen to reside in a 
program of “civilization” where the goal was to assimilate the Aboriginal nations 
through means of education and agriculture, including removal to agricultural 
settlements.2 Some government officials and humanitarian groups also began at 
this time to perceive First Nations as a doomed people, and the “civilization” 
program as the best, and perhaps only, means to secure their future. The treaty 
annuity policy itself would come to play a significant role in supporting the civi-
lization program.
The policy shift from larger one-time treaty payments to smaller annual expen-
ditures in exchange for First Nation lands occurred in 1818.3 There are two distinct 
reasons for this change in policy. The first had to do with cutting costs and general 
financial retrenchment. There was constant pressure from Britain throughout the 
first half of the nineteenth century to transfer the costs of administering Indian 
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affairs to the colonial government, including, after 1818, the costs associated with 
land surrender treaties. Part of these discussions inevitably included schemes to 
self-finance the Indian administration through sales of Indian land.4 In 1819, Lieu-
tenant-Governor Peregrine Maitland promoted a plan to self-finance the costs of 
these land purchases. He reasoned that if government could privately sell some 
of the land received through treaty at auction, using a method that included a 
mortgage with a 10 percent down payment, the interest from the down payments 
could then be used to finance the annuity.5 Maitland, however, soon realized that 
current land values could not support this scheme and was forced instead to ask 
the Imperial Treasury to assume the annual treaty expenditure.6
The other significant motivation for changing from a one-time payment to 
perpetual annuity had to do with the well-being of the Aboriginal treaty signa-
tories. Colonial Secretary Lord Bathurst argued in 1816 that one-time payments 
did not result in a lasting benefit, and that annual payments would better address 
ongoing Aboriginal welfare needs.7 Government officials recognized that First 
Nations would require another source of income as their traditional means of 
livelihood came increasingly under threat.8 Annuities had been part of the treaty-
making process in the United States since the Canandaigua Treaty of 1794, where 
they were intended to provide “the means of subsistence in agriculture and arts, as 
well as their improvement in … civilization.”9 The first use of annuities as part of 
treaty terms in British Canada appeared in 1818 in the Adjetance, Rice Lake, and 
Lake Simcoe-Nottawasaga Treaties, followed closely by the Rideau, Longwoods, 
and Huron Tract Purchases of the early 1820s.10
There is no evidence that Aboriginal people were consulted about the change of 
payment and not much indication of their views when officials first explained the 
changes.11 Certainly government officials sold the change as a lasting economic 
advantage in contrast to the one-time payment, and it is likely that the changes 
were received favourably. Aboriginal leaders had long expressed fear for their 
people’s future, especially their ability to continue to make a living from tradi-
tional pursuits. They not only made specific requests for annual payments as part 
of later pre-Confederation treaties, but seemed to be well aware of the annuity 
terms offered in the American treaties, and often argued vociferously for similar 
terms. Further, there was a long-standing precedent of Aboriginal gift diplomacy 
that had been adopted by colonial governments to establish or maintain military 
alliance with First Nations.12 An annual distribution of presents represented 
renewal of these alliances, and even though Aboriginal leaders would later insist 
that annuities and presents be considered separately, the notion of an annual distri-
bution to reaffirm relations between nations was not a foreign one, having been an 
Aboriginal pre-contact practice that was later adapted to by traders and govern-
ment officials.13
Annuities were not the only form of regular payment that was discussed prior 
to Confederation in terms of providing welfare assistance for First Nations. The 
annual presents were also considered important in this regard. Between 1816 and 
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1860 a number of commissions were established and proposals made with a view 
to limit the Indian expenditure, especially with regards to the annual presents.14 
Invariably, measures to end the practice of annual presents were met with strong 
opposition from First Nations, and from certain government officials familiar with 
First Nation diplomacy. They argued that the presents were not only crucial to 
honour past military alliance and maintain future loyalty, but were also necessary 
on humanitarian grounds for the economic well-being of First Nations.15 For 
example, the Bagot Commission report of 1847 recommended that Indian presents 
be continued for First Nations residents in the Canadas because treaty annuities 
and the sale of lands were not yet sufficient to finance either their welfare or the 
civilization program.16
While the annuity policy was contemplated in the context of ongoing support 
for First Nations, the annuity amount was at base a payment for land, and was 
often perceived by representatives on both sides of the negotiations in terms of 
the relative value of the land. The link between land sales and treaty annuity 
expenses began with Maitland’s scheme to self-finance the annuity in 1819, and 
was later explicitly made in three land surrender treaties post-1850, the largest 
being the Manitoulin Island Treaty of 1862,17 where a provision was included to 
base the annuity amount directly on the interest earned on land sales.18 Aboriginal 
negotiators also understood the link that government officials made between the 
annuity amount and their particular means of valuing the land in terms of agricul-
tural or mineral worth. In 1846 Ojibwa brought copper ore and coal to govern-
ment officials in order to argue the value of the land.19 During the negotiations for 
the Robinson-Huron Treaties and Treaty 3, chiefs insisted on an annuity amount 
commensurate with the potential value from the recent discovery of minerals on 
their lands.20 Conversely, following the difficult Treaty 3 negotiations, the First 
Nations who had signed Treaties 1 and 2 complained that their annuity amount 
should not have been less than the Treaty 3 amount given that their lands were of 
greater agricultural value.21 
The Evolution of the Annuity as an Economic Benefit
It is clear from the historical evidence that at different times both Aboriginal and 
government representatives at the treaty discussions intended and perceived the 
annuity to be a significant economic benefit. Furthermore, if the annuity was at 
base a payment for land, negotiations over the annuity amount tended to focus 
more on economic need than land valuation.22 This section will examine the initial 
use of the annuity to assist the government’s civilization program, and how that 
concept evolved with the later western treaties, including use of the annuity to 
attempt to control behaviour. First Nation perceptions are also examined, namely 
the expectation that the annuity and other treaty benefits would be sufficient to 
assist them to provide for themselves and their families in the future. The expec-
tation from both parties was that the annuity would assist in transitioning from 
a hunting and trapping economy to one based on agriculture, or supplement 
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the continuation of a traditional hunting and fur trade economy.23 Government 
officials often thought of the annuity as a form of necessary support, at least until 
such time as First Nations were able to be more self-sufficient and live without 
treaty assistance through a policy of enfranchisement.
Increasingly in the 1800s missionaries and other humanitarian groups, such as 
the Aborigines Protection Association, began to lobby governments to support 
programs to protect and assimilate First Nations through religious and agricultural 
education.24 After the inception of annuities in 1818, various levels of government 
and government commissions considered the use of the annuity to fund a program 
of civilization. The traditional resource base of many First Nations in southern 
Ontario had already been significantly eroded, and the idea was to use the annuity 
to help First Nations transition from a hunting- and trapping-based economy to an 
agrarian economy, ultimately reducing any future welfare expenditure. In 1828, 
Major General Henry Darling, who was asked to investigate the Indian Depart-
ment, argued that the proposed Indian civilization program could be financed 
by using annuity payments and a portion of the annual presents to pay for such 
related items as schools, houses, roads, farm stock, agricultural equipment, and 
seed.25 In 1829, under the leadership of Lieutenant-Governor Sir John Colborne, 
the annuities began to be credited to band accounts, along with money from the 
sales and leases of Indian lands, where it was used to promote the civilization 
program, and specifically towards the creation of settlements at Coldwater, the 
Narrows, St. Clair, and Munceytown.26
Prior to 1829, the payment of annuities in goods was favoured over cash as a 
means to encourage agriculture and civilization. In some of the earlier treaties 
government officials refused chiefs’ requests that annuities be paid in cash from 
a paternalistic view that the money would be squandered instead of provide for 
tangible economic benefits. Government had a firm notion of the types of goods 
and services it felt should be financed by the annuity. Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs Samuel Peters Jarvis told the Legislative Committee in 1839–1840 that the 
practice of purchasing agricultural implements with the annuity money “seem[s] 
at first to have been unwillingly adopted, but the tribes now convinced that it is 
the most beneficial to their interests.”27
Chiefs, of course, had their own ideas of the best use of annuities and other 
resources, and were also known to ask for goods instead of cash. Toward mid-
century, chiefs began increasingly to demand assistance in education and agri-
culture as part of treaty terms. For example, Chief Peau de Chat, as part of the 
Robinson-Huron Treaty negotiations in 1849, wanted government to pay for a 
schoolmaster, a doctor, a blacksmith, a carpenter, a magistrate, and an agricul-
tural instructor. Aboriginal leaders were pragmatic about their peoples’ future in a 
changing world. They required assurances that they could hunt, fish, and trap on 
their lands as they had always done, but also insisted on treaty terms sufficient to 
help those who chose to settle down and farm.
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In fact, the Aboriginal ability to negotiate the annuity amount, according to the 
available historical evidence, appears greater after 1850, and is especially evident 
for the Robinson Treaties, and Treaties 1 and 3, which set the tone for all future 
treaties, to Treaty 11 in the early 1920s.28 When Lieutenant-Governor Archibald 
met with the Ojibwa in Manitoba in 1870 as part of Treaty 1 negotiations, he 
was immediately given two demands by Chief Prince for compensation. The first 
was to honour a former treaty commitment made by Lord Selkirk in 1817 for an 
annual distribution of one hundred pounds of tobacco for each of two nations, 
and the second was for Ojibwa loyalty during the recent Métis uprising.29 When, 
by the spring of 1871, there was still no treaty or compensation, Ojibwa chiefs 
posted a notice on the church door that settlers would no longer be permitted 
to take up land without first negotiating a treaty. That summer, the journal The 
Manitoban reported difficult negotiations, which ultimately resulted in an annuity 
greater than what had been authorized by Ottawa, as well as a long list of other 
items, from clothes to livestock to chiefs’ buggies, which would later come to be 
known as the “outside promises.” 30
Treaty 3 negotiations for lands in Ontario west of the Great Lakes took four 
seasons and resulted in a renegotiation and an increase to the three-dollar annuity 
provided in Treaties 1 and 2. In 1869, after surveying the situation in the context 
of the Métis uprising, Simon Dawson strongly advised that diplomatic arrange-
ments be made with the Salteaux of Lake of the Woods for their consent in order 
to ensure future safe passage across their lands.31 Negotiations began in 1870 with 
an initial demand from the Salteaux Chiefs for a ten-dollar per capita annuity 
for a right-of-way only. The following summer, government negotiators were 
instructed to negotiate a full land surrender treaty, but only managed to settle past 
claims through the distribution of provisions and clothing and a three-dollar per 
capita payment. Nor were they any more successful in the third season of negotia-
tions, when the Salteaux insisted on an increase to the three-dollar annuity offered 
in Treaties 1 and 2, and refused to accept Treaty Commissioner Simpson’s offer of 
doubling this amount for the first year and including annual salaries of twenty-five 
and fifteen dollars for chiefs and headmen respectively. In 1873, annuity amounts 
were increased to ten dollars for the first year, including a five-dollar “gratuity,” 
and five dollars thereafter. The offer was again refused, and a counter-offer was 
made by the Salteaux in the form of an older petition listing twenty demands, 
including more than a doubling of the amounts offered to date.32 The impasse was 
finally broken when one chief stepped forward to indicate his desire to treat on 
terms less than the twenty written demands, and others followed suit. The final 
terms included a twelve dollar gratuity for the first year followed by a five dollar 
annuity, as well as an annual budget of one thousand five hundred dollars for the 
purchase of ammunition and twine, twenty-five dollar annual salary for the chief 
(one per band) and fifteen dollars for the headmen (three per band), along with a 
number of agricultural items.
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After Treaty 3, the annuity amount remained relatively fixed and the most 
contentious negotiations focused on other items that chiefs were able to include 
as part of treaty terms, such as agricultural implements, grain, and cattle, as well 
as education, instruction, and health care. Another topic of considerable concern 
for First Nations was whether, after the treaties were signed, they would be able to 
freely hunt, fish, and trap as they had always done. It should be kept in mind that 
while much of the focus of the negotiations may have shifted from the annuity to 
other items in the later Numbered Treaties, the discussion remained largely one of 
the extent of government assurances of livelihood support in exchange for land, a 
topic that was very much open to negotiation.
It is clear that the Aboriginal treaty signatories viewed the annuity as a signifi-
cant economic benefit, and had expectations that the treaty terms, including the 
annuity amount, would be sufficient ongoing government livelihood support in 
exchange for land. 33 As historian Jean Friesen put it: “The only price which could 
balance the loss of such property was the assurance of full economic security.”34 
Ojibwa Chief Wa-sus-koo-koon of the Treaty 1 negotiations argued that a three-
dollar annuity was not enough to live on should they settle down to farm, and thus 
requested that a house be built and furnished, and a plough and cattle provided for 
each Ojibwa who decided to farm.35 Saulteaux Chief Ma-we-do-pe-nais justified 
the twenty written demands during Treaty 3 negotiations as necessary “so that 
we may be able to support our families as long as the sun rises and the water 
runs.” 36 
There are many examples throughout the nineteenth century of government 
officials characterizing the annuities as important economic support for Aborigi-
nal livelihood. Government reports of treaty negotiations often contain reference 
to destitute First Nations who would benefit from taking treaty. Treaty Commis-
sioner Simpson had characterized the annuity during Treaty 1 negotiations in 1871 
as a “bounty” that would give the Aboriginal signatories an economic advantage 
over the white settlers.37 He also used the following justification for limiting the 
annuity to three dollars: “The sum of three dollars does not appear to be large 
enough to enable an Indian to provide for himself with many of his winter neces-
sities, but as he receives the same amount for his wife or wives, and for each of 
his children, the aggregate sum is usually sufficient to procure many comforts for 
his family.”38 He later wrote in his report of Treaties 1 and 2 that the First Nations 
“are fully impressed with the idea that the amelioration of their present condition 
is one of the objects of Her Majesty in making these treaties.” 39 Alexander Morris 
noted in his treaty report of 1873 that he had explained to the Saulteaux Chief Ma-
we-do-pe-nais that the terms of the treaty were to “put into their hands the means 
of providing for themselves and their families at home.”40
Morris often spoke of the well-being of children, and of “children’s children” 
during negotiations, which was a powerful expression that future generations 
would be looked after under the treaty relationship.41 Morris stated on the third 
day of Treaty 3 negotiations in 1873: “I only ask you to think for yourselves, 
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and for your families, and for your children and children’s children,”42 and on 
the fourth and sixth days of Treaty 4 negotiations respectively: “The promises 
we have to make to you are … not only for you but for your children born and 
unborn,” and “it is for you now to act … whether or not you will … let your 
children grow up and do nothing to keep off the hunger and the cold that is before 
them.”43 And again, he emphasized during Treaty 6 negotiations: “I would like 
your children to be able to find food for themselves and their children that come 
after them,”44 and “I have told you that the money I have offered you would be 
paid to you and to your children’s children.”45 It was the annual payment of the 
annuity that most outwardly represented the assurances that future generations 
would be looked after.
In correspondence regarding implementation of the treaty and annuity, there is 
occasional mention of the necessity of the annuity, or for advances made against 
the annuity, to carry certain families over winter.46 Mostly, however, the annuity 
was seen as an important aspect of an overall livelihood strategy, along with 
other means such as the raising of grain, selling of cattle, traditional pursuits, 
and seasonal employment. A typical entry from an Indian Affairs annual report 
reads: “The members of this band do little grain-raising, depending more upon 
their income derived from each annuity, hunting, fishing and working for lumber 
camps, and at various occupations.”47
Given that the annuity was understood by government officials in the context 
of livelihood assistance, how the money was spent was of considerable concern 
throughout the nineteenth century as part of treaty implementation. The annual 
reports are full of commentary on how the annuity money was being used, or 
should be used, and how government policy and practices should direct the 
spending of annuities. For example, many officials argued for a policy of payment 
closer to the reserves, away from settlements where annuities could be spent on 
“useless or injurious articles.”48 Regulations were created to attempt to control 
the purchase of goods, including the prohibition of certain items described as 
“trinkets” or “gewgaws,” as well as alcohol. A policy was further instituted that 
required prospective traders to apply for a licence from government in order to sell 
their goods during annuity payment periods.49 There was also ongoing discussion 
in the annual reports as to whether government should revert to paying annuities 
in goods of lasting utility, such as agricultural items, instead of in cash.
Indian agents were asked to report specifically on the use of the annuity, and 
there are consistent entries that indicate whether, in the opinion of the agent, the 
annuity was spent wisely on items that could assist with attaining a livelihood, 
especially over the winter months. The following is fairly typical: “I visited 
Macleod the next day and found them spending their money in a judicious manner. 
A goodly number of cooking and heating stoves were bought and also furniture 
and the usual supply of warm clothing for themselves and families.”50 The Indian 
commissioner for Manitoba and the Northwest Territories explained that the 
annuity payments were initially made in the springtime, but were moved closer 
APR Volume 7.indb   80 1/13/10   12:13:45 PM
 
This is an excerpt from "Volume 7: A History of Treaties and Policies" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013 
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.
  /  The Treaty Annuity as Livelihood Assistance and Relationship Renewal  /  1
to winter because families had been in the habit of wasting their spring annuities, 
leaving them unprepared for the coming winter “in the form of clothing etc.”51
Annuities were sometimes specifically targeted to programs of agriculture or 
education. For example, annuities could be used to pay for school infrastructure 
or teachers’ salaries, such as in 1884 when Indian Superintendent Walton for the 
northern superintendency at Sault Ste. Marie encouraged the Temogamingue 
Band to use one dollar per capita of their annuity money toward the salary of a 
schoolteacher.52 Annuities could be communally used by First Nations to purchase 
livestock, grist or sawmills, or for church repairs or church-related items. Agri-
cultural items in particular were often advanced to First Nations on credit against 
future annuities. For example, the Water Hen Band councillors in 1882 asked for a 
cow to be provided, which they would collectively pay for out of their annuities,53 
and the Pas Band in 1899 bought a team of horses “by an assessment on their 
annuity money.” 54 Annuities could also be placed into special student accounts for 
Aboriginal children, which they could then access in a lump sum, with interest, 
upon graduation.55
On other occasions, Indian agents may have withheld annuities or otherwise 
coerced the use of annuities for agricultural- or educational-related purposes. For 
example, in 1887, Indian Agent Pither forced the Little Forks Reserve to pay 
for the keep of their cattle by withholding their annuities,56 and in 1893 fines for 
absenteeism of children from the schools appear to have been levied against the 
Parry Island Band annuities.57 Annuities could thus be used by government as 
economic punishment or incentive in an attempt to control behaviour.
The most evident example of this occurred after the North-West Rebellion of 
1885, when annuities were withheld from those First Nations thought to have 
participated. The withholding of annuities was initially justified in order to pay 
for damages from looting,58 but soon became a tool of punishment and reward 
for subsequent behaviour. Indian agents reinstated annuities on a case-by-case 
basis as a reward to those who showed “practical evidence of sincere contrition, 
furnished by cheerful application to the pursuit of industry.”59 Discretion was 
used in the determination of whose annuities to reinstate as a means to encourage 
others to follow their good example. Annuities were also withheld or deducted 
from individuals in response to damages or thefts, such as in the case of alleged 
cattle killings.60 Other examples include annuities being withheld in cases of 
polygamy; from those who had deserted their wives and children (often to help 
pay for their support61); from those refusing to take part in statutory labour (e.g., 
road building); for those who were thought to have been overpaid (as a result of 
double counting or changes to the policies or practices of determining eligibility); 
and as an incentive to encourage residency on the reserves.
The annuity policy came under attack from time to time by Indian Affairs 
officials as being outmoded and too expensive. Enough time had passed between 
the signing of Treaty 7 in 1877 and Treaty 8 in 1899 that the question of the 
best method of payment, annuity versus one-time lump sum, was again debated 
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in earnest. As earlier, arguments for and against the annuity were made both in 
the context of government expenses and Aboriginal welfare. The Hudson’s Bay 
Company (HBC), missionaries, and First Nations themselves consistently lobbied 
government for a treaty as a means to assist First Nations maintain a livelihood 
in the years leading up to Treaty 8. These lands, however, were not required 
for settlement in the same way as more southern arable lands had been, and the 
government remained reluctant to make a treaty, arguing that the HBC maintained 
a responsibility to assist First Nations in times of need. When government finally 
decided to make a treaty, Secretary of Indian Affairs J. A. Macrae argued that the 
rationalization for the perpetual annuity in the early 1870s, “when the Indians 
were looked upon as a disappearing race,” no longer applied, and that a single 
payment of, for example, one hundred dollars each would be more appealing for 
signatories.62 Ultimately, however, the decision to maintain the smaller perpetual 
annuity was made in consideration of future generations.63
Government proved more than willing to put aside its assimilationist goals 
out of economic expediency when it came to treaty-making in areas where game 
was still thought to be plentiful or where agricultural opportunities were limited. 
In some cases, government proved reluctant to sign treaties at all in areas where 
it was felt that First Nations could continue to live off the land with a minimum 
of interference, and in other cases government was practical in its support of 
a hunting economy, even if that seemed counterintuitive to its assimilationist 
policies.64 Treaty commissioners, beginning with Treaty 3, included provisions 
for ammunition and twine, as well as agricultural implements and cattle, in order 
to support existing hunting economies. References can also be found in govern-
ment records to the annuity as a means of support for traditional economies.65
Certainly education, agricultural settlement, and assimilation through such 
means as enfranchisement remained fundamental goals of the government’s 
Indian administration. There is considerable evidence that government often 
thought of the annuity as a necessary but temporary measure of welfare support 
until such time as First Nations could become self-reliant. And this was in spite 
of the language of metaphor about the treaties and the annuity lasting as long 
as the sun shines and the water runs. A report from the treaty commissioner’s 
office in Winnipeg, dated months after the signing of Treaty 3, recommended that 
temporary instead of permanent annuities be adopted for a future treaty because 
certain bands “are already sufficiently civilized … that in fifteen or twenty years, 
if not sooner, they will be able to do without assistance from Government.”66
The notion of the role of treaty, and of the annuity, as livelihood assistance 
until eventual assimilation into the broader society, when such assistance may 
no longer be required, is most evident in the policies of enfranchisement and 
withdrawal of treaty to take up Métis scrip. The idea that First Nations needed 
to eventually assimilate remained at the forefront of Aboriginal policy develop-
ment in the nineteenth century, and was reflected in the enfranchisement provi-
sions of the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857, the Gradual Enfranchisement Act 
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of 1869, and the amalgamated Indian Acts of 1868 and 1876. Under this policy, 
individuals were considered wards of the state until enfranchised, either volun-
tarily or mandatorily, and the process of becoming full Canadian citizens included 
being able to live without treaty-based assistance. Beginning with the Gradual 
Civilization Act, individual males over twenty-one years of age could apply for 
voluntary enfranchisement, and if successful, their wives and children would be 
enfranchised along with them.67 Applicants, who were extremely rare, first had to 
meet certain criteria designed to ensure that they would be able to live without 
government or treaty assistance; for example, that they were formally educated 
and free of debt.
Beginning with the Gradual Enfranchisement Act, and replicated in the Indian 
Act of 1876, women who married non-treaty Indian men were enfranchised and 
could, upon their request and approval by their First Nation, be provided with a 
one-time payment of ten years’ worth of annuities, referred to as commutation. 
Between 1879 and 1894 there were a total of 182 commutations,68 but this number 
increased substantially after 1920 when the power to refuse commutation was 
removed from First Nations in order that “unprogressive bands” could no longer 
prevent their members from gaining “full citizenship.” 69 While the enfranchise-
ment and commutation policy may have been perceived as a way to ultimately 
reduce the annual treaty expenditure, it was also true that women who married 
outside of treaty were then not considered to be in the same need of treaty-based 
assistance.70
Government policy regarding Métis in the nineteenth century was, in accor-
dance with the Manitoba Act of 1870, to provide Métis heads of households with 
a one-time allotment of land or money referred to as scrip, in place of negotiat-
ing land rights with a collectivity.71 Government, however, was often prepared to 
make a distinction between those Métis who had adopted an “Indian way of life,” 
and those who had not—the former being permitted to join treaty if they so chose, 72 
while the latter were not considered to be in need of the same treaty assistance 
as First Nations. Amendments to the Indian Act in 1879 allowed for individuals, 
often men on behalf of their families, to withdraw from treaty to take up scrip. 
Initially, the amount of scrip was to be reduced by the amount of annuities already 
received, but this provision was amended in 1886 such that individuals could 
take scrip without first paying back their annuities. This legislative amendment 
resulted in many communities losing a large portion of their members through the 
taking up of scrip. One official in Manitoba, for example, reported of the Duck 
Bay Reserve that “all the members of this band withdrew from treaty excepting 
a few families who removed to Pine Creek,”73 and another reported that “the idea 
of leaving the treaty and receiving scrip in compensation for annuity … spread 
almost like an epidemic.” 74
Indian Affairs officials maintained a right of refusal for discharges from 
treaty based on whether it was felt that the individual or family in question was 
sufficiently self-reliant to live without the government annuity and other treaty 
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benefits.75 The report for the District of Alberta in 1887, in justification of the 
large numbers that had been allowed to withdraw from treaty, stated: “None were 
permitted to withdraw, however, unless the Agent and the Inspector of Indian 
Agencies were satisfied that they could support themselves without assistance 
from the Government.” 76 The report goes on to indicate, however, that “in very 
many of these cases [to date] it was injudicious to give them [treaty signatories] a 
discharge, as they proved to be quite incapable of earning their own livelihood, and 
some of them have applied and have been re-admitted into treaty.” Requests for 
withdrawal from treaty were more carefully considered once government began 
to fear growing poverty among those not covered by treaty-based assistance. An 
Indian agent’s report of the Scrip Commission’s consideration of withdrawals in 
the Treaty 6 area assured that “none but those who would support themselves 
and families in the future were discharged.”77 These examples of enfranchisement 
and leaving treaty to take up Métis scrip clearly demonstrate that government 
perceived the annuity and other treaty benefits as essential livelihood assistance 
for many treaty signatories.
In order to help contextualize the economic importance of the annuity at the 
time the treaties were signed, some evidence for the price of goods and salaries 
was compiled. A five-dollar annuity in 1850 could have bought over 160 pounds 
of flour or 50 pounds of pork,78 and in 1871 could have bought 100 pounds of 
flour or 30 pounds of beef. 79 Arthur Ray has shown that in 1870 a hunter with a 
family could equip himself for the year for about twenty to twenty-five dollars, 
the equivalent to an annuity for a family of four or five.80 An annuity of five 
dollars for a family of five in the early 1880s was equivalent to about one month’s 
wages as either an Aboriginal farm labourer 81 or sawmill worker.82 There is further 
evidence from treaty elder testimony that the annuity had important economic 
significance for families and communities well into the 1950s.83
The oral evidence from treaty elders, especially from Treaty 4 to Treaty 8, is 
remarkably consistent in the view that promises of livelihood assistance were a 
primary consideration during treaty negotiations. A continuing right of livelihood 
is one of five guiding principles of the understandings of treaty that came out of 
extensive elder testimony outlined in the book Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan.84 
Likewise, the Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research group’s years of interviews 
with elders in Alberta revealed an overarching belief that the treaties concerned 
first and foremost people’s livelihoods.85 The authors of The True Spirit and 
Original Intent of Treaty 7 concluded: “That they would be taken care of was the 
theme reoccurring throughout the elders’ testimony.”86
Once government made up its mind to clear title to land that was thought to be 
useful for settlement or access to resources, its priority was to do so as quickly 
and as cheaply as possible. That the welfare of the Aboriginal people living on 
these lands was often a secondary consideration can be seen from government’s 
inaction in responding to First Nations’ requests for treaty as a means of liveli-
hood assistance, until such time as the land was deemed to be of value for settle-
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ment or natural resource use.87 To discount livelihood assistance as a significant 
consideration for government leading up to, during, and after treaty negotiations, 
however, is to also discount a large body of evidence to this effect.
Assurances of ongoing government livelihood assistance were consistently 
sought by First Nations, and often made by government representatives. The 
historical record shows that Aboriginal signatories had expectations of being 
looked after, and historians and others have aptly demonstrated that government’s 
subsequent policies and practices sadly had an opposite effect.88 The message of 
livelihood assistance was used as an incentive in treaty negotiations, but did not 
always have the desired effect for more northern First Nations who continued to 
make a living through traditional means. Some nations in the Treaty 8 area, for 
example, “did not want to take treaty, as they had no trouble in making their own 
living.”89 Most, however, were not only receptive to the message of livelihood 
assistance, but repeatedly asked for clarification of government’s assurances.
Gifting, Feasting, and Renewal
It is important to understand something of the larger historical and cultural context 
in which the annuity was introduced. Prior to treaty relations with the govern-
ment, many First Nations had alliances of trade with fur traders, some had military 
alliances with early colonial governments, and all likely had alliances and trading 
relations of one kind or another with each other. These alliances had a tradition 
of gift-giving and reciprocity in common, referred to by some scholars as gift or 
forest diplomacy. Much of the traditional ceremony and First Nation practice of 
gift-giving was adopted and actively practiced by fur traders and colonial govern-
ments. The regular, often annual, gift-giving signalled a renewal of alliances and 
trading relationships. This section will examine the perception of the annuity as 
an important annual renewal of the treaty relationship. Along with gift-giving, 
feasting was also of great ceremonial importance for First Nations in cementing 
and renewing relationships between nations, and the provision of treaty rations 
at treaty events will also be briefly examined as possible treaty renewal. There 
is considerable evidence that the treaty, rather than a once-for-all unchanging 
agreement between treaty parties, was in fact often considered by First Nations 
to be a fluid or living agreement that could be modified over time. The annuity 
payments represented a renewal of the agreement and a time when grievances 
could be voiced and treaty terms reconsidered.
Some early examples of alliances between First Nations and European 
newcomers include French fur trade alliances with the Huron, the Algonquin, and 
the Montagnais (or Innu), and Dutch and later British alliances with the Iroquois 
nations. It was essential that all of these alliances included not only an initial gift-
giving ceremony, but periodic ceremonial reaffirmation or renewal of relations. 
The Dutch, and later the British, adapted to Iroquois customs of diplomacy, 
commonly referred to as the “Covenant Chain.” This involved a complex process 
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of renewal that included regular distribution of gifts to chiefs, warriors, and 
their dependants.90 In 1756, Sir William Johnson was given responsibility to 
promote and augment the British military alliance with the Six Nations League of 
Iroquois. Johnson was successful in this by following elaborate Iroquoian custom 
and ceremony that involved the exchange of wampum belts and distribution of 
presents, also included as compensation to wounded Iroquois warriors and their 
families. In fact, Johnson became somewhat of a recognized expert in First Nation 
diplomatic practices, and actively advocated for the use of wampum belts, distri-
bution of presents, and specifically the need for renewal of existing treaties.91
When the concept of annuities first became a reality in Canada in 1818, there 
had long been an established practice of gift diplomacy that continued to exist 
alongside the provision of annuities. After 1812, these diplomatic practices turned 
into formal distribution of annual presents made at specified times and locations 
for First Nations on both sides of the border who had been loyal to the British 
during conflict with the Americans. This distribution was part of a trend that began 
with colonial adaptations to Aboriginal diplomatic practices. The early French-
First Nation military and trade alliances were continued by the British after the 
fall of New France and the Pontiac uprising of 1760.
The annual presents as a means of maintaining and honouring military alliance 
and the annuities as compensation for land, while occasionally confused by 
British colonial administrators, were mostly recognized as serving two distinct 
purposes. In fact, chiefs insisted that government keep the two items separate for 
fear that officials would try to use the same annual payments to honour different 
obligations, especially given government attempts to curtail the annual present 
as a cost-cutting measure.92 It is nevertheless apparent that the annual present 
and the annuity could be made up of the same types of goods,93 and could even 
on occasion be distributed at the same time and location.94 What is important for 
this discussion is that the concept of an annual payment for the pre-Confederation 
Upper Canada treaties fit well within an overall trend that saw the continuation of 
an Aboriginal tradition of treaty or relationship renewal.
Evidence that the annuity payments followed a tradition of gift diplomacy is 
even more prevalent for the post-Confederation Numbered Treaties, which were 
made in the context of long-standing fur trade relations. Fur traders were long 
accustomed to adapting to Aboriginal practices of regular renewal of relationships 
through the giving of gifts. Fur traders and First Nations over time negotiated 
social protocols and practices that were deeply rooted in Aboriginal concepts of 
renewal and reciprocity. Many of the fur trade practices would in turn come to 
inform the treaty relationship, and it is of interest to note that the annuity itself was 
sometimes referred to in negotiations as a “gift.” 95 Alexander Morris explained 
his distribution of presents at Fort Ellice in 1876 as being “in conformity with the 
custom prevailing here, descending from the Hudson’s Bay Company’s rule.” 96 
There are also examples where HBC-First Nation gift diplomacy found expres-
sion in treaty terms, such as the suit of clothing given to chiefs and headmen.97
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The HBC traditionally looked after provisioning First Nations for the hunt as 
part and parcel of their economic interests, as well as providing rations, often as 
advances on credit, in order to assist certain families over winter or through other 
difficult times. When the government purchased the Hudson’s Bay Company 
Charter in 1870, there was an expectation that they had also inherited the respon-
sibility for providing relief to Aboriginal families in times of need. The fact that 
many of the Numbered Treaties were negotiated around the question of govern-
ment responsibility for looking after First Nations in times of need harkens back 
to these fur trade relations. As fur traders often advanced goods on credit to 
assist certain families over winter, so government officials often advanced goods 
against future annuities, also to assist families over winter.98 In this way, the 
treaties continued and further formalized for First Nations what had been ongoing 
relations of mutual benefit that had evolved out of the fur trade.99 The perception 
of continuity in this regard was helped by the fact that HBC personnel continued 
to play a significant role during treaty negotiations and treaty implementation, 
including occasionally assisting with the annuity payment.100
Feasting was closely associated with gift-giving, and was another Aboriginal 
traditional practice of relationship renewal that found expression first with fur 
traders and later as part of the treaty relationship.101 There are many references 
in the historical record to the necessity of government “rations” or “provisions” 
during negotiations, or later as part of treaty implementation. These rations or 
provisions were sometimes made in the context of relief, harkening back to the 
HBC practice of providing relief, but more often were made in response to First 
Nation expectations of protocol. One of the demands of the Saulteaux during the 
1870 season of the Treaty 3 negotiations, in exchange for a right-of-way across 
their lands, was to be provided with sufficient goods in order to have a feast each 
year at the annuity payment.102 Evidence for feasting and requests for provi-
sions for feasting can be found throughout implementation of the annuity. The 
lack or poor quality of rations at treaty payments often became a major cause of 
complaint, and was in itself considered by First Nations to be a significant breach 
of treaty terms. Some even refused to accept the annuity until such time as satis-
factory rations had arrived.103 The symbolic and ceremonial importance of certain 
treaty items in the context of relationship renewal, such as provisions for feasting 
or the giving of suits of clothing, flags, and medals to chiefs, should not be under-
estimated.104 Time and again complaints about these items were at the heart of 
much of the dissatisfaction expressed over non-fulfilment of treaty terms.
An analysis of the annuity adds to an already large body of literature demon-
strating that First Nations perceived the treaties quite differently than government. 
For government, the treaties were once-for-all land transactions that bound both 
parties to certain ongoing obligations. These obligations were fixed in place by the 
written terms of the treaty. First Nations traditions did not include such a concept 
of obligations being bound-up in the unchanging words on a page.105 For First 
Nations, the treaties were sacred agreements made in the presence of the Creator, 
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which could also not be broken once they were made. This, however, did not 
mean that the agreements could not be adjusted as circumstances might warrant. 
For First Nations, the treaty terms were fluid, rather than fixed, and there was an 
expectation that terms could be discussed and reviewed as part of an annual treaty 
renewal.106
There is considerable evidence, for example, of First Nations refusing to accept 
the annuity, which was interpreted as a protest in order to draw attention to their 
particular claim or grievance. This was likely more than a simple show of dissat-
isfaction, however. To not accept the annuity was a refusal to renew the treaty 
relationship, and on some level represented an attempt to renegotiate the relation-
ship.107 The Pembina, Portage La Prairie, and St. Peter’s bands all refused their 
annuity in the early 1870s over the so-called “outside promises” issue of Treaties 
1 and 2.108 There are reports of at least fifteen instances in the Indian Affairs 
Annual Reports alone of First Nations and chiefs refusing to accept annuities, and 
constant attempts to renegotiate aspects of the treaty.109 In 1884, Indian Inspector 
Wadsworth for Treaty 6 wrote about grievances being voiced during annuity 
payment periods: “It is the occasion in the year upon which they feel bound to 
mention them [grievances], as again receiving the money is looked upon by them 
as a ratification of the treaty.”110 The refusal to accept the annuity, in these terms, 
was thus a refusal to ratify the treaty for a given time.
Ultimately, refusal to accept the annuity and other means of attempting to 
review and renegotiate aspects of the treaty that were not satisfactory to First 
Nations, speak strongly to a belief that the terms of the treaties would be periodi-
cally reviewed and could be altered. Rather than representing the starting point 
for the relationship and its primary defining attribute, the treaty document may 
be more accurately understood from a First Nation perspective as one component 
of a longer relationship continuum that began with the elaborate commercial 
compacts of the fur trade.111 Historian James Morrison argued that the Ojibwa 
viewed the Robinson Treaties as an “open contract,” with use of the term “Chi-
Debahk-(In)-Nee-Gay-Win.”112 There is further linguistic evidence that the Cree 
word for “treaty” had the meaning to “weigh and measure” the relationship, 
which included review of the annuity payment itself.113 Cardinal and Hildebrandt, 
in their analysis of elders’ testimony in Saskatchewan, concluded that “the initial 
treaty process was to provide a framework within which further arrangements 
arising from the agreement to live together was to be discussed in subsequent 
treaty negotiations.”114
The Treaty Annuity in a Modern Context
The treaty annuity in a modern context is more than representative of ongoing 
mutual obligations, but is seen by many First Nations as a renewal of the treaty 
relationship—a relationship that continues to define much of the political landscape 
in terms of Aboriginal issues across Canada. Nevertheless, as much as the annual 
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payment may be perceived as an important symbolic renewal of a relationship and 
as outwardly representative of all of government’s treaty promises of livelihood 
assistance, there are those who find the distribution of four or five dollars a year 
to be demeaning if not unethical.115 There have been a number of calls to revisit 
the historic treaties and to revitalize or modernize the historic treaty relationship. 
First Nations have stated that the treaties were intended to provide for a new 
economic base, given that they had been deprived of their traditional one.116 The 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) report, noting that the annuity 
payment was regarded as a formal opportunity to discuss and renew the relation-
ship each year, argued that the treaties need to be flexible enough to address new 
concerns of an evolving relationship. The RCAP report goes on to recommend 
that a formal process of revitalization be established, and that this process include 
a reconsideration of the “treaty promises of wealth transfer.”117
The issue of modernization or indexation of the treaty amount has been raised 
in different contexts: in treaty elder testimony, through the media and other means 
of political lobby, under court challenge, and in the research papers of Robert 
Metcs, Jean Allard, and John Richards. Metcs makes a persuasive argument, using 
the legal underpinnings of the Marshall decision, that the only way to make sense 
of the “common intention” of treaty parties regarding the annuity is to assume 
that the Crown, rather than the First Nations, accepted all the risks associated with 
potential future inflation and congruent devaluation of the annuity. The annuity 
was meant to be a significant contribution to livelihood, he argues, and the Crown, 
believing the currency to be relatively stable, was prepared to provide annually 
into the future the buying power of the dollar amount at the time the treaties 
were signed. By way of comparison, he concludes that the very same arguments 
of justness and fairness that lead to Canada’s modifications to old-age pensions 
commensurate with inflation should also be applied to the treaty annuity.118
Allard is very critical of the government’s handling of Indian affairs, specifi-
cally of what he sees as rampant misspending of funds on misguided welfare 
programs and perpetuation of a reserve system that encourages abuses of power 
from chief and council. The solution, he argues, has been there all along in the 
provisions of the historic treaties. For Allard, a large individualized annuity 
benefit represents an opportunity to empower individuals and establish respon-
sible First Nation governance structures.119 This notion has been picked up and 
further developed by John Richards of the C. D. Howe Institute. Richards argues 
that transfer payments to First Nations on reserve not only create unhealthy or 
corrupt governance, but also act as a disincentive for individuals to leave the 
reserves. Providing individualized benefits to band members, while at the same 
time reducing band transfers, he argues, would first empower individuals to make 
a real choice of where to live, and also help create accountability on reserve via the 
creation of taxation structures.120 It is not at all clear, however, that First Nations 
would welcome a reduction of band transfers in favour of individual benefits, as 
this may be viewed by some as a further erosion of communal-based Aboriginal 
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cultural norms. Allard had proposed an increase of the annuity amount from five 
dollars to five thousand dollars, while Richards proposed halving this amount. But 
what is the real value of the annuity amount indexed to today’s cost of living?
Stewart Clatworthy has estimated a measure of cost of living change over 
the life span of the treaties using the consumer price index (CPI) and wholesale 
price index. Calculations were made based on the original signing dates of the 
Numbered Treaties, and some of the more important adhesion dates, when First 
Nations signed on to an existing treaty at a later date. Calculations are not included 
for the Robinson Treaties because of a lack of a reliable measure of price change 
for Canada prior to 1867. Official CPI estimates of cost of living changes only 
exist from 1914 to 2007. Statistics Canada has, however, developed estimates 
Table 5.1: Estimated 2007 Value of Original Annuity Amount, Adjusted for the Consumer 
Price Index, for Major Treaty and Adhesion Dates





Treaties 1 & 2 1871 16 $5 $100.32
Treaty 3 1873–1875 26 $5  $85.51
Treaty 4 1874–1877 33 $5  $86.29
Treaty 5 1875–1876 21 $5  $84.40
Treaty 5 1908–1910 17 $5  $91.52
Treaty 6 1876–1882 36 $5  $85.18
Treaty 6 1889–1898  5 $5  $91.41
Treaty 7 1877  7 $5  $83.40
Treaty 8 1899–1900 38 $5  $92.69
Treaty 9 1905  9 $4  $72.28
Treaty 9 1906 11 $4  $77.85
Treaty 9 1929–1930 11 $5  $58.90
Treaty 10 1906  5 $5  $97.31
Treaty 10 1907  2 $5  $89.85
Treaty 11 1921 19 $5  $54.45
Treaty 11 1922  2 $5  $59.46
APR Volume 7.indb   90 1/13/10   12:13:46 PM
 
This is an excerpt from "Volume 7: A History of Treaties and Policies" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013 
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.
  /  The Treaty Annuity as Livelihood Assistance and Relationship Renewal  /  1
of wholesale prices and related indices since 1867. Clatworthy has established 
a measure of Canadian price change from 1867 to 2007 by splicing the general 
wholesale price index (excluding gold) for the 1867–1914 period to the 1914–
2007 CPI series.121 Table 5.1 contains the CPI adjusted amount in 2007 dollars 
for the major treaty signing and adhesion dates. In 1871 or 1906, five dollars is 
estimated to have been equivalent to about one hundred dollars in 2007.
Conclusion
An analysis of the terms, implementation, and perceptions of the annuity payment 
provides a window on which to view some of the fundamentals of the historic 
treaty relationship—namely the extent of livelihood assistance intended, and 
view of the treaties as “living” and evolving arrangements. The annuity policy 
was initially adopted as both a cost-cutting measure and as a means to promote 
First Nation welfare and encourage assimilation. Government clearly viewed the 
annuity as a significant economic expenditure and benefit,122 attempting to limit 
the cost in relation to the perceived value of the land, and using it to fund its civi-
lization program. The annuity was expected to help certain families over difficult 
times, just as the HBC had provided livelihood assistance prior to the treaties. 
Annuities were used as assistance in the transition from a hunting to an agrarian 
economy, or to supplement more traditional livelihood pursuits, depending on the 
circumstances. Ultimately, many government officials considered the annuity to 
be a necessary but temporary welfare measure until First Nations became enfran-
chised.
First Nations, on the other hand, were able to negotiate an annuity greater than 
what government was initially willing to provide, and were led to believe that 
the annuity and other treaty terms would be of significant economic benefit for 
themselves and future generations. Far from a means of temporary support on the 
way to becoming enfranchised, the annuity represented for many First Nations 
an annual renewal of nation-to-nation agreements. An annual payment fit well 
with the Aboriginal practice and concept of renewal that was an important part 
of early military alliances and later fur trade relations. Evidence is strong in both 
the historic written record of treaty implementation and First Nation elder oral 
testimony that, from the First Nation perspective, the treaties were part of a living 
and evolving relationship. In this conception of the relationship, the treaty terms 
were not bound by the written word, but could be reviewed and renegotiated from 
time to time. In attempts to renegotiate aspects of the treaty, First Nations often 
refused to renew the relationship by refusing to accept the annuity.
Today, many of the 369 Treaty First Nations in Canada view a renewal and 
revitalization of the treaty relationship as long overdue. The lack of a common 
understanding of the treaty terms has led to deep feelings of mistrust that impact 
virtually all aspects of the modern relationship. Cardinal and Hildebrandt, in their 
summary of elder testimony, conclude that “the livelihood arrangements of treaty 
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must be the basis for bringing back on track the treaty relationship.”123 That the 
annuity and other treaty terms have not been effective as livelihood assistance is 
clear from the disparity that exists today between Treaty First Nations and other 
Canadians. A study of treaty annuities helps to underscore the importance of both 
historic and modern-day treaty renewal and the need to come to a mutually accept-
able understanding on the question of treaty livelihood assistance.
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